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How a Sneaker-Proxy Business Entered the Scraping Industry
From Chi Proxies to NetNut Limited-edition sneaker drops are highly anticipated, restricted releases from top brands like Nike, Adidas, and New Balance, often featuring collaborations with prominent athletes, artists, or fashion houses. These exclusive launches leverage intentional scarcity to drive massive cultural demand and secondary market resale value. The phenomena “Limited-edition sneaker drops” has created
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Opaque Scrapers Hiding in the Crowd
On May 14th, the English-language website of Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) was targeted by a large-scale scraping event which generated a massive volume of automated traffic. The traffic came from approx. 1.35 million unique IP addresses, spread across more than 7,300 AS and 223 country codes. This investigation targets opaque scraping services that threatens an open Internet.
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The Future and Past of Residential Proxies
Residential proxies is the largest security challenge we are currently facing. Dozens of attacks against our infrastructure have been originated in residential proxy providers including volumetric application layers attacks, heavy pen tests, intrusion attempts or non-consented scraping. When we manage to back-trace the attacks to residential providers we obtained similar response to our reporting: “thanks for reporting, we are ethical providers, leave us alone”.
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Statement on the November 18, 2025 Court Decision in Quezon City
In June 2022, in the Philippines, the National Security Adviser Hermogenes Esperon requested that the National Telecommunications Commission direct all internet service providers to block access to several independent news websites. This request resulted in a memorandum sent to the ISPs, which led to the blocking of Bulatlat and Pinoy Weekly, both of which were
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Proxy.vn’s hidden Tin-Roof datacenter fueling fake accounts and DDoS attack on iStories.media
The Russian investigative media iStories received a series of Denial of Service attacks in early November 2025. At peak the website was flooded by more than 30.000 IP addresses. Although the attack infrastructure was globally distributed, a large portion of the flooding botnet was geo-located in Vietnam. Follow us on a journey to the tin-roof data center industry in Vietnam.
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Catfish Incorporated: How the Dating Scam Industry Works
A year ago, during our investigation into the Russian disinformation operations known as “Doppelganger”, we uncovered that the same bulletproof hosting provider associated with the notorious Aeza (also known as Evilempire or Lethost) was being used to promote both Doppelganger’s front domains and various dating scams. We discovered that the infrastructure associated to disinformation hosted
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Analysis of global takedown attempts targeting Qurium’s Bifrost Mirrors
Qurium Media Foundation has uncovered multiple takedown requests submitted to Google targeting its Bifrost mirror service, an initiative designed to keep independent journalism accessible in countries with heavy Internet censorship. Qurium’s investigation reveals coordinated international efforts to suppress journalism and erase investigative reporting through legal mechanisms. The takedown demands came from state-linked institutions and reputation management firms operating in Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Russia, and Venezuela.
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Proxy provider connected to state sanctioned research center linked to attack against investigative media
Russian independent media outlets came under DDoS attack after publishing an investigation revealing how Russian oligarch and billionaire Oleg Deripaskaex been buying sex with minors.
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Denial-of-Service Attacks on Investigative Media Traced to yet another Proxy Provider
Investigative media outlets Armando.info (Venezuela) and IDL Reporteros (Pero) have been targeted by a series of denial-of-service attacks. The DDoS attacks were once again traced to infrastructure operated by a proxy provider who lack adequate control over how their services are used by paying clients.
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VoIP Providers serving the Scam Empire
Without the possibility of making thousands of phone calls per day to victims across the world, the scam call centers would not be “in business”. The vast majority of the calls are routed via five VoIP providers. This article reveals who the VoIP providers are, and why they have little interest in effective KYC and AML procedures to prevent fraud in their infrastructure.
Zahra Joya, Afghanistan
"Since 2021 we have seen more than one hundred decrees that restrict women’s freedom"
Olena Hetmanenko, Ukraine
“Maintaining objectivity in the middle of a war is challenging but essential”
Carmen Riera, Venezuela
"It’s exhausting to run a media outlet in a country under a dictatorship"
Donghui Mun, NKDaily, South Korea
“North Korean citizens remain largely unaware of the extent to which their rights are violated”
Urszula Kifer, Frontstory.pl, Poland
“Russian influence is the most pressing issue in Poland that needs investigative journalism attention”
Victor Muchnik, Eyewitnesses, Russia
We left because we didn’t have any wish to breathe the same air with people who support the war
Abdalle Mumin, Somali Journalist Syndicate
"All those attacks in the refugee camp where I grew up gave me the ambition to become a journalist"
Gustavo Gorriti, IDL-Reporteros, Peru
“Democracy in the world is in its greatest moment of crisis since the 1930s”
Rawan Damen, ARIJ, Jordan
"Our journalists suffer reprisals all the time"
Ruslan Myatiev, TurkmenNews, Turkmenistan
“We report about things no one in Turkmenistan dares to tell”